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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACY STRAUSS, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID TUSCHMAN, 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
Docket No. 2008-0356 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellee agrees with and stipulates to the Appellant's Jurisdictional 
Statement that appears on Page 1 of his Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court correctly conclude as a matter of law that 
absent a clearly defined statutory right, a stepparent who is not in loco parentis lacks 
standing to seek visitation with a stepchild? 
Standard of Review: In Utah, the appropriate standard of review for questions of 
standing is correctness. See, Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20 at ^ 10 (internal citations 
1 
omitted). Decisions of the trial court will not be disturbed unless the Appellant is able to 
demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law. 
Issue Number 2: Did the trial court abuse the broad discretion afforded to it 
when it refused to find contempt when a willful intent to violate a court order was not 
proven by clear and convincing evidence? 
Standard of Review: A decision finding a party not to be in contempt of court 
rests solely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Therefore, a trial court's 
decision will not be disturbed unless the decision "is so unreasonable as to be classified 
as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion." See, Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P.2d 
988, 990 (Utah Ct. Appeals 1999), citing Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 
240 (Utah 1976). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
The Appellee agrees with and stipulates to the Appellant's discussion of 
preservation of issues for appeal that appears on Pages 2 and 3 of his Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative to this Court's consideration 
of the issues presented, above: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (2007) 
"In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents 
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child." 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1978) 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children, as may 
be equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents 
and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2) 
"Person other than a parent" means a person related to the child by marriage or 
blood, including: 
(a) siblings; 
(b) aunts; 
(c) uncles; 
(d) grandparents; or 
(e) current or former step-parents, or any of the persons in Subsections (2)(a) 
through (d) in a step relationship to the child. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(l) and (2) 
(1) In accordance with Section 62A-4a-201, it is the public policy of this state that 
parents retain the fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, 
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supervision, upbringing, and education of their children. There is a rebuttable 
presumption that a parent's decisions are in the child's best interests. 
2) A court may find the presumption in Subsection (1) rebutted and grant custodial 
or visitation rights to a person other than a parent who, by clear and convincing evidence, 
has established all of the following: 
(a) the person has intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent; 
(b) the person and the child have formed an emotional bond and created a parent-
child type relationship; 
(c) the person contributed emotionally or financially to the child's well being; 
(d) assumption of the parental role is not the result of a financially compensated 
surrogate care arrangement; 
(e) continuation of the relationship between the person and the child would be in 
the child's best interests; 
(f) loss or cessation of the relationship between the person and the child would be 
detrimental to the child; and 
(g) the parent: 
(i) is absent; or 
(ii) is found by a court to have abused or 
neglected the child. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This case proceeds from the trial of the contested issues in 
the divorce of Petitioner/Appellee Tracy Strauss (hereinafter referred to as "Strauss") 
from the Respondent/Appellant David Tuschman (hereinafter referred to as 
"Tuschman"). 
Course of Litigation: One year after their final separation, the parties stipulated to 
entry of a bifurcated Decree of Divorce, which was entered June 10, 2005, and made 
effective May 13, 2005. (R. at 53 and at 70-71). In July 2005, Tuschman sought and was 
awarded temporary visitation with Strauss's minor daughter from a former relationship, 
Ruzele, despite Strauss's objection. (R. at 135). 
Tuschman's initial court-ordered visits were professionally supervised until he 
completed an anger management course or provided an assessment concluding the course 
was not necessary. (R. at 136). In October 2005 Tuschman sought to have Strauss held 
in contempt for failing to facilitate unsupervised visits. (R. at 172). The issue of 
Strauss's contempt of court was reserved for future determination by a stipulation entered 
into on January 27, 2006, (R. at 240), but determination of Strauss's contempt was not 
certified as a trial issue during the pretrial settlement conference held on January 24, 
2007. (R. at 380). 
Trial Proceedings: A trial was held on October 18 and 19, 2007. Both parties 
were present and represented by their present counsel of record. Both parties were placed 
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under oath and testified at the trial of this matter, as did expert and lay witnesses. The 
trial court declined Strauss's request to interview Ruzele in camera. (R. at 704, page 178). 
Strauss testified that after an intense conflict occurred when Tuschman attempt to 
pick up Ruzele for an informal visit in May 2005, Ruzele did not desire any further 
contact or relationship with Tuschman. (R. at 709, pages 41 and 42). Until that point, 
Strauss was amenable to Tuschman having a limited relationship with Ruzele, but 
because of Ruzele's strong desire not to have any further relationship with her former 
stepfather, Strauss supported her daughter's decision and in May 2005 withdrew her 
consent to any formal or informal relationship between Ruzele and Tuschman. (R. at 709, 
pages 41 and 42). 
With regard to Tuschman's request for ongoing visitation with Ruzele, the trial 
court concluded that because Tuschman was not a legal parent or an immediate family 
member to Ruzele, he did not have a statutory right to assert a claim for visits with 
Ruzele. (R. at 596). The trial court further concluded that because Strauss had 
terminated any in loco parentis standing Tuschman may have once had and now objects 
to visitation, Tuschman also lacked common law standing to assert a claim for 
prospective visitation with Ruzele. (R. at 599). 
With regard to Tuschman's request that Strauss be found in contempt of court, 
because it was not persuaded that Strauss's failure to force Ruzele to visit with Tuschman 
was a willful violation of a court order, the trial court did not find Strauss in contempt of 
court. (R. at 615 and 616). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ruzele Carolann Strauss was born on January 7, 1994, to Strauss and Robert 
Steven Hayden. Mr. Hayden was not aware of Ruzele's birth until 2005, but has since 
established a relationship with her. (R. at 572 and 589). 
On July 20, 1996, when Ruzele was 2lA years old, Strauss and Tuschman married 
and resided in Texas after their wedding. (R. at 572). In July 1997, after one year of 
marriage, the parties separated and Strauss and Ruzele moved from Texas to Park City, 
Utah. (R. at 572). For nearly five years thereafter, Strauss and Ruzele lived apart from 
Tuschman, who continued to live in Texas. (R. at 572 and 573). During this separation 
period, Tuschman would only see Ruzele periodically when visiting Strauss. (R. at 572, 
573 and 586). 
In July 2002, the parties and Ruzele moved into a home in Jeremy Ranch, Utah. 
This living arrangement was short-lived and Strauss and Ruzele moved out a year later in 
July 2003. (R. at 573). The parties reconciled once more and Strauss and Ruzele lived 
with Tuschman from February 2004 until May 2004. (R. at 573). The parties have lived 
separate and apart since May 2004. (R. at 573). 
Although Tuschman had informal visitation with Ruzele following the parties' 
final separation, visitation only continued due to a temporary order entered in July 2005 
over Strauss's objection. (R. at 578). Strauss allowed Tuschman to have visitation with 
Ruzele in order to comply with a court's order, but she would otherwise have not allowed 
such visitation to occur and opposes the continuation of any future visitation or 
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relationship. (R. at 592). Ruzele has expressed her repeated desire not to have any 
relationship or contact with Tuschman. (R. at 592). 
Tuschman was awarded interim supervised visits with Ruzele. (R. at 136). After 
Tuschman had completed his anger management assessment and informed Strauss of the 
same, he did not request further visits with Ruzele. (R. at 704, page 83). Seeming to 
respect the desires and feelings of Ruzele, Tuschman ceased trying to visit with Ruzele 
after August 2005. (R. at 704, page 83). Tuschman's last contact with Ruzele was in 
March 2007 in conjunction with the court-ordered reconciliation therapy and visitation 
evaluation; Tuschman did not actively seek other contact with Ruzele. (R. at 709, page 
287). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: 
When Tuschman filed his Counter-Petition and also at the time of trial, Utah did 
not grant a former or current stepparent a statutory remedy to seek visitation with a 
stepchild. By the time this matter came to trial, the Utah Supreme Court had issued its 
opinion in Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, which held that the common law doctrine of in 
loco parentis does not independently grant standing to one seeking visitation against the 
wishes of a fit legal parent. Because Tuschman lacked statutory and common law 
standing to assert a claim for rights of visitation with Ruzele, the trial court correctly 
denied Tuschman's request for court-imposed visitation. 
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Point II: 
Under Utah Law, to find contempt the trial court must find from clear and 
convincing proof that the one "knew what was required by a court order, had the ability 
to comply with the order, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." See, 
Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), quoting Kunzler v. O'Dell 855 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App.1993). While the trial court expressed its "complete 
dissatisfaction with [ Strauss's] behavior," it did not find that this behavior was 
demonstrated to have risen to the level of a willful and knowing refusal to abide by a 
court order. (R. at 616). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT LACKS 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER TUSCHMAN'S VISITATION 
CLAIM BECAUSE HE DOES NOT HAVE STANDING 
CONFERRED TO HIM BY STATUTE OR COMMON LAW. 
In Utah, "[standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied before a 
court may entertain a controversy between two parties." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, f 
12, 154 P.3d 808. (further citations and internal quotations omitted). Under the 
traditional standing test, a party seeking relief does not have standing unless the interests 
of the parties are adverse and the party seeking relief asserts "an interest that is legally 
protectable under either statute or the common law." Id. In this case, the trial court 
correctly determined that Tuschman lacks standing to seek visitation rights with his 
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former stepdaughter, Ruzele, because he does not have an interest in her that is legally 
protected under Utah's statutes or common law, as they existed at the time of trial. 
A. Utah's Statutes Did Not Give the Trial Court the Authority to 
Award Visitation Rights to Persons Other than Grandparents 
and Immediate Family Members. 
As it existed at the time of Tuschman's Counter-Petition and at the time of trial, 
the Utah Code did not provide a mechanism by which a stepparent could seek visitation 
with a stepchild because it only allowed courts to determine the "parent-time rights of 
parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate family . 
. . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5)(a)(2007)(emphasis added). 
In 2007, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this principle in Jones v. Barlow 
when it stated that the only nonparents who have standing to seek visitation with a child 
under Utah's statutes are: (1) "an immediate family member . . . in the context of a 
divorce," and (2) "grandparents in certain circumstances." See, Id. at f 40 (citing UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-5(5)(a) and 30-5-2). Although the Legislature has not specifically 
addressed the standing of a non-relative surrogate parent, the Jones Court held that "[t]he 
grant of standing to immediate family members . . . creates the negative implication that 
all other categories of nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation rights." See, Id. 
It is undisputed that Tuschman is not Ruzele's grandfather. Although Tuschman 
tried to persuade the trial court that he is an immediate family member to Ruzele, he 
could not provide any clear authority for this contention to the trial court nor does he 
provide any authority to this Court. 
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1. Tuschman Cannot Support His Assertion That a Former 
Stepparent Should be Considered a Member of a Child's 
Immediate Family. 
The former version of what is now UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5, which is the 
version addressed in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), granted the right to 
seek visitation to "parents, grandparents, and other relatives." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 
(1978). In 1993, Utah's legislature replaced the ambiguous phase "other relatives" with 
the more precise phrase "members of the immediate family," which remains in the 
present version of what is now UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5)(a). The 1993 revision has 
no bearing on the Gribble holding, as it relied solely on the stepparent's standing as a 
"parent," as opposed to an "other relative." Subsequent revisions of this statute have 
failed to include a stepparent as a class of persons entitled to assert non-parental visitation 
rights.1 
Tuschman could not cite for the trial court or this Court any statute equating a 
former or current stepparent to an immediate family member because through May 2008 
no such statutes existed in either Title 30 of the Utah Code, which deals exclusively with 
rights of spouses and former spouses, or anywhere else in the Code. Moreover, the trial 
court conducted its own legal research and it could not find any reference in Utah statutes 
Even with the 2008 enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103, which Tuschman 
concedes does not apply retroactively to confer standing to him, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-5(5) remains unchanged. 
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or discussion in case law that clearly describes a stepparent as a member of a child's 
immediate family. 
Further, Tuschman cannot rely on any case law establishing a former stepparent 
rights as an immediate family member. State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
(commonly referred to as "Schoolcraft"), allowed a current stepparent to assert standing 
in a juvenile court dependency and neglect proceeding. The Schoolcraft court defined 
stepparent as "a person ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive custodial 
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive parent." Id. at 716 (citing UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-45-2(14)(1990)). Although §78-45-2(14) has been amended to remove any 
definition of stepparent, the former statutory language is instructive because its definition 
of stepparent requires that the stepparent be a current spouse of the custodial parent. 
Because Respondent is no longer the spouse of the Petitioner, Schoolcraft is not 
applicable to Tuschman. 
2. The 2008 Enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-101 et 
seq. Confirms That Stepparents did not Previously Have 
Statutorily Recognized Standing as Immediate Family 
Members to Assert Claims for Visitation, 
Tuschman provides no authority for his contention that the Utah Legislature 
"confirmed its original intentions" by enacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-101. Indeed, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-52-103, which provides a detailed discussion of the Legislature's 
intent, does not state that it believed that stepparents previously had standing to seek 
visitation conferred on them by statute or common law. 
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Therefore, because no Utah statutes existed between 2004 and 2007 giving a 
stepparent standing to seek visitation rights to a stepchild, Tuschman did not have 
statutory standing to seek visitation with Ruzele. 
B. Tuschman Does not Have Common Law Standing to Seek 
Visitation With Ruzele Because He Does Not Have an In Loco 
Parentis Relationship and Because There is no Judicially 
Recognized "De Facto/Psychological Parent" Doctrine in Utah. 
If a party lacks a statutory basis for standing, a court may still have jurisdiction 
over his claim so long as he can assert a right that is legally protected under a common 
law doctrine. See, Jones v. Barlow at T[ 12. In this case, there are no common law 
doctrines that allow Tuschman to seek visitation with Ruzele because: (1) he does not 
have an in loco parentis relationship with Ruzele; and (2) there is no "de 
facto/psychological parent" doctrine in Utah. 
1. Tuschman Does Not Have Standing Under the Doctrine of 
In Loco Parentis Because Strauss Terminated any Such 
Relationship When the Parties' Relationship Ended. 
The doctrine of in loco parentis is a temporary common law doctrine that "is 
applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent 
in a child's life." Id. at f^ 13 (further citations and internal quotations omitted). Although 
a person in loco parentis may have the same rights, duties, and liabilities as a parent while 
the in loco parentis relationship lasts, the Utah Supreme Court holds in Jones that "a legal 
parent may freely terminate the in loco parentis status by removing her child from the 
relationship, thereby extinguishing all parent-like rights and responsibilities vested in the 
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former surrogate parent." Id. at Tf 22. Moreover, the Jones Court held that a party "does 
not have standing to extend the in loco parentis relationship against a [biological 
parent's] wishes." Id. at f 29. Consequently, the doctrine of in loco parentis is not 
sufficient in and of itself to provide a party with standing to seek visitation because it is 
"temporary and does not convey rights that survive the termination of the parent-like 
relationship." Id. a t f 2 5 . 2 
In Jones, one of the partners in a same-sex relationship helped raise the other 
partner's biological child by funding the costs of her partner's artificial insemination, 
participating in the child's prenatal care, caring for the child two years after her birth, and 
listing herself as the child's co-guardian. Id. at Iffi 3 - 9. After the biological parent left 
the relationship and prevented her former partner from having access to the child, the trial 
court found that the partner had standing to seek visitation under the doctrine of in loco 
In Gribble v. Gribble, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he common law 
concerning the termination of the [in] loco parentis status is that only the surrogate parent 
or the child is able to terminate the status at will." 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). 
However, the Jones Court overruled Gribble and found that Gribble's interpretation of 
the doctrine of in loco parentis was "incorrect as a statement of the historical common 
law rule." 2007 UT 20 at [^ 21. The Jones Court also reasoned that "[i]t would be a 
perverse doctrine of law that left a legal parent unable to enforce support obligations 
against a surrogate parent's will . . . but allowed a surrogate parent to extend her parent-
like rights against the legal parent's objection." 2007 UT 20 at f^ 24. 
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parentis and awarded her visitation with the child. Id. On appeal, the Jones Court 
reversed the trial court's decision and found that the partner did not have standing to seek 
visitation against the wishes of the biological parent under the doctrine of in loco 
parentis. The Jones Court reached this decision because the biological parent had 
terminated her former partner's in loco parentis relationship when she moved out of the 
couple's residence and refused to allow the partner to interact with the child. Id. at f 29. 
Like the biological parent in Jones, Strauss terminated any in loco parentis 
relationship that Tuschman may have had with Ruzele when she moved out of the 
parties' residence in 2004. Although Tuschman had voluntary visitation with Ruzele 
from the parties' separation through May 2005, Strauss has only allowed subsequent 
contacts in order to comply with the trial court's temporary order. Moreover, the fact that 
Strauss now objects to Tuschman having a relationship with Ruzele, is sufficient in and 
of itself to terminate any in loco parentis relationship that Tuschman may have had with 
Ruzele because Jones holds that such a relationship cannot continue over the objections 
of the biological parent. Therefore, Tuschman does not have standing under the doctrine 
of in loco parentis to seek visitation with Ruzele. 
2. Tuschman Does Not Have Standing Under a "De 
Facto/Psychological Parent" Doctrine Because Such a 
Doctrine Does Not Exist In Utah, 
There are no other common law doctrines that would allow a stepparent to seek 
visitation with a child. This is so because the Jones Court refused to create a "de 
facto/psychological parent" doctrine that would "[create] in a third party the right to seek 
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visitation with a child in contexts outside those recognized by [Utah's] domestic relations 
laws." Id. at H 30. 
The Jones Court refused to adopt a "de facto/psychological" parent doctrine for 
the following reasons. First, it concluded that adopting a "de facto/psychological parent" 
doctrine would "[fail] to provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily and 
uniformly applied in all cases." Id. at f^ 31. Second, the Court found that creating such a 
doctrine would force it to "create law from whole cloth where it currently does not exist," 
which would cause it to "overstep its bounds and invade the purview of the legislature." 
Id. at f 35. Third, the Court reasoned, "the creation of a de facto parent rule absent any 
precedent in Utah law would be an unwarranted expansion of the common law" because 
it would "defy the principle of incremental development" and because "there are no 
broadly accepted principles to guide [courts] to a de facto parent doctrine." Id. at ^ 37, 
38. Finally, the Jones Court concluded that a de facto/psychological parent doctrine 
"conflicts with Utah statutory law" because the legislature had already determined that 
the only nonparents that had standing to seek visitation are grandparents and immediate 
family members. Id. at f 40. As Tuschman concedes, subsequent statutory standing 
granted to stepparents does not affect his case. 
In light of Jones, it is clear that there are no common law doctrines that allow 
Tuschman to seek visitation with Ruzele. Although Utah courts have previously awarded 
stepparent visitation, the holding in Jones and the Legislature's modification of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 30-3-35 have invalidated the legal foundation that these cases once used to 
award visitation to stepparents. 
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For the reasons discussed above, the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over Tuschman's claim for visitation with Ruzele and it 
correctly declined to make any conclusions of law regarding her best interests. Further, 
the trial court correctly declined to consider any evidence or make any findings or 
conclusions of law regarding parental fitness, as such matters are in sole jurisdiction of 
the Juvenile Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-103(l)(g). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DID NOT FIND STRAUSS IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
To find contempt, a court must find from clear and convincing proof that the one 
"knew what was required by a court order, had the ability to comply with the order, and 
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.M See, Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P.2d 
988, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), quoting Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). Although the trial court expressed its displeasure with Strauss's actions, it 
concluded that the evidence presented by Tuschman did not meet the burden of proof 
required for a finding of contempt. 
Although Tuschman requests this Court to remand the issue of Strauss's contempt 
for further findings, he seemingly ignores that the trial court dedicates over seven pages 
of its Memorandum Decision to discussing its findings of fact regarding Tuschman's 
relationship with Ruzele and difficulties experienced with implementing court-ordered 
visitation. Nowhere in its lengthy discussion did the trial court find that Strauss had 
willfully prevented Ruzele from visiting with Tuschman. While the trial court opined 
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that any contempt sanctions would have had little deterrent impact on Strauss, the trial 
court nonetheless refused to find contempt or find that Strauss acted with a willful intent 
to violate the temporary visitation order. 
If Tuschman believes the trial court's findings of fact regarding contempt are 
insufficient to support its conclusions, he fails to meet his burden to have this Court set 
aside the trial court's original findings. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." See, Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App. 11 at ^ 9, 176 P.3d 476, 480 
(Utah Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Further, to challenge the findings of 
fact, one must first "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence." See, Id., quoting Featherstone 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Tuschman fails to 
marshal any evidence regarding the trial courts contempt findings in his Brief. 
Because Tuschman cannot demonstrate to this Court that the trial court abused the 
considerable discretion afforded to it when making findings of contempt of court, the 
original order of the trial court should stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee Strauss has fully addressed each of the issues raised by the Appellant 
Tuschman and has specifically demonstrated that decision of the trial court and the 
concomitant findings were thorough, well reasoned, and consistent with existing law. 
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The aspects of the trial court's decision appealed by Tuschman should be affirmed. 
Further, the Appellee should be awarded her costs and fees related to this appeal. The 
case should be remanded for a determination of those fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of December, 2008. 
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